By Professor Frank P. Harvey
Winner, 2013 Canadian Political technology organization Prize in diplomacy the just about universally permitted reason behind the Iraq battle is particularly transparent and constant - the united states determination to assault Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003 was once a made of the ideological time table, faulty priorities, intentional deceptions and grand ideas of President George W. Bush and well known 'neoconservatives' and 'unilateralists' on his nationwide protection workforce. regardless of the common allure of this model of historical past, Frank P. Harvey argues that it is still an unsubstantiated statement and an underdeveloped argument with no logical origin. His booklet goals to supply a traditionally grounded account of the occasions and techniques which driven the US-UK coalition in the direction of warfare. The research is predicated on either genuine and counterfactual facts, combines causal mechanisms derived from a number of degrees of study and finally confirms the position of course dependence and momentum as a miles better reason behind the series of choices that ended in conflict.
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Additional resources for Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence
In essence, Gore was endorsing an even stronger, more forceful multilateral policy (consistent with his push for ‘assertive multilateralism’ and ‘forward engagement’) to ensure the regime was toppled. With this in mind, the claim by some leaders, including Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, that regime change would not have been the policy of a Democratic government, is patently false. These are crucially important facts often missed by neoconists, who con stantly implore us to acknowledge the role Bush officials played in creating the necessary political context to sell the war.
All of these important details, historical facts and relevant theories are excluded from accounts pushed by proponents of the conventional wisdom. The evidence compiled in the following chapters is consistently missing from neoconist texts, because most of this information directly challenges the valid ity of standard narratives. As discussed earlier (and in more detail in Chapter 2), Bush and Blair ‘rejected’ the preferences of neoconservatives in favor of an alternative strategy endorsed by almost everyone else.
According to these popular accounts, the political context largely constructed by the Bush administration would not have prevailed in the absence of the administration responsible for creating it. Yet scholars who defend this position typically commit two serious errors when constructing their historical accounts of the war. First, they assume only one dominant perspective was sold to the American public (and Congress), and the myths about ‘imminent threats’ at the center of this perspective were responsible for shaping perceptions and policy preferences.